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A Means to an End:
Adding Value to the Preference Debate

Sally1 is a disadvantaged woman who lives in her car. She has refused
many kinds of help – from staying at a shelter to living at government subsidized
housing. The help workers who want to assist her are at their wits’ end. They
know that her living in her car is untenable in the long term, but no amount of
conversation will sway her. Even more frustrating, Sally repeatedly insists that
she’s proud that she’s never accepted help from anyone. She’d be the first one to
tell you that she’s never been on welfare, never taken a hand-out, never begged,
and never leaned on the government. Oddly, her face lights up with pride as she
recounts these achievements. The social workers know that they will have to call
the police if they can’t get her to agree to accept their offers of housing. And,
Sally knows that she won’t change her mind.
In philosophical terms, Sally has an adaptive preference for living in her
car. This is because, for reasons that few can understand, Sally has chosen to
live in her car rather than in a more stable subsidized apartment even when it
was offered to her. While subsidized housing isn’t ideal for many, by most
people’s standards it’s still better than living in a car. Yet, reasonable offers of
like this have been rejected by Sally. Unfortunately, it seems that her poverty has
caused her to prefer her current life lived out of her car, regardless of other
available options. In instances like these it is hard to understand Sally’s choice,

1

Sally is a fictious name for a woman whom I personally have met. Her name has been changed so that
her privacy and struggles can be respected.
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and even more difficult to determine the best way to help her. So, what is the
best way to help the disadvantaged? Would offering what they prefer be most
helpful to them, or is it better to override their preferences? And is the way that
we view the choices of the disadvantaged accurate?
In this paper I argue that the traditional philosophical views of the
disadvantaged’s choices are not wholly accurate nor helpful to intervention
efforts. To establish this, I’ll discuss the theories of utility, preference
utilitarianism, and adaptive preferences. Then I’ll sketch a new view of
preferences, as means and ends, that explain why the disadvantaged often make
what seem to be bad choices. Further, that the reasons behind the
disadvantaged’s bad choices may not be as bad for them as we believe. Finally, I
will explain how to apply this new view of preferences to best help the
disadvantaged.

1.

The Problem
Often the privileged2 are charged with the task of helping the

disadvantaged.3 This is because the disadvantaged often don’t know the best
way to help themselves out of their suffering and have few resources (outside of

2

Privileged refers to those people who are in stable and secure positions in the socio-political structure of
their society.
3
Disadvantaged refers to the marginalized within societies: race, age, gender and sexual identification
(LGBTQAI+), poor, differently abled, and others that their society devalues. The choice to use
disadvantaged instead of specifying the circumstance is important because people do not often consider
themselves part of a marginalized group. It is my hope that this change in description may prevent
othering; where a person sees themselves set apart from those who are like them in their suffering or
from those offering their assistance.
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the privileged’s offerings) to help them. Few disadvantaged people 4, unless they
are activists and likely not disadvantaged themselves, can offer solutions or
interventions to assist the disadvantaged; it takes privilege to help the
disadvantaged among us. Though, deciding the best way to help often leads the
privileged to try to provide the help they would want if they were disadvantaged.
This is because those with privilege believe that since they have not suffered
through poverty, and have avoided it, that they are able to determine what is best
for the disadvantaged.
Further, the choices the disadvantaged make underscore that they most
often don’t know what’s best for them. For example, the disadvantaged may fail
to pursue a higher education in favor of a job, even though a minimum wage job
will likely only ever pay minimum wage and provide little room for advancement.
This choice fails the intuitive understanding of the privileged; long term plans and
a bit of suffering now will reap rewards. Further, the disadvantaged may seek
comfort in others and prematurely start families by finding solace in romantic
relationships as a result of their hardship (Tirado). This choice may or not lead to
a lasting relationship with the romantic partner but can lead to the challenges of
early parenthood along with the instability involved in raising a child alone. This
further exacerbates the challenges for both new parents – together or not.
Meanwhile the privileged recognize that delaying parenthood is essential for

4

“Around the world and in every U.S. state, women are more likely than men to live in poverty, with
additional disparities by race/ethnicity, age, and education level (https://iwpr.org/issue/poverty-welfareincome-security/poverty/).” As a result, one cannot deny this is an issue overwhelmingly for women.
However, I prefer not to use she/her pronouns because it excludes those in the LGBTQIA+ Community
who are some of the most at risk and disadvantaged globally.
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personal development and financial security. And, they are unlikely to seek
comfort from challenges through their relationships. As a result, the privileged are
equipped with healthier coping mechanisms and are more likely to have a larger
support group. For those wishing to help the disadvantaged, they believe that
their understanding of examples like these will help them provide the aid that will
do the most good for those needing their help. Trust, then, rightly belongs in the
hands of the privileged and their guidance.
Yet, sometimes it seems that the disadvantaged do know what is best for
them. While every choice they make may not be the best one for them under the
scrutiny of the privileged, the disadvantaged are the ones who understand why
they make the choices they do. It is one thing to say that the disadvantaged do
not know how to escape poverty, and another to say that they do not know how
to live in poverty and to make the best of their challenging circumstances.
Living in poverty entails more than choosing between higher education or
employment or delaying parenting or not; it also requires resourcefulness to
arrive at solutions for the issues that plague them. Some practical challenges of
the disadvantaged are unreliable transportation, lack of affordable childcare,
budgeting limited resources, lack of access to bank accounts, and navigating
welfare systems. (This is assuming that they are not homeless – if they are, more
practical and life-threatening challenges exist.) There are also intangible
challenges to existing in a disadvantaged state, such as sleep deprivation and
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the psychological toll of marginalization and social exclusion.5 Few could argue
that the privileged have the experience and understanding needed to overcome
problems like these. Considering such challenges, one could argue that the best
people to determine what’s good for the disadvantaged are themselves.
Based on the above, we have arrived at a crossroads: both the
disadvantaged and privileged have reasons to believe that they can best help the
disadvantaged. To demonstrate this more clearly, let’s consider how each would
argue their position. This is what that dialogue might sound like:

Disadvantaged: “You don't know what it's like to be poor. You haven't lived
this. You're talking about $60,000 per year jobs and savings, and I'm
talking about working part-time in a gas station without money for a
babysitter, and a car that's basically dead.”
Privileged: In reply, “I know things are hard for you, but this isn’t about the
car and all that stuff. It’s about all the choices you’ve made. What made
you think the gas station was a good idea? Why did you have a baby when
you were so young? What do you mean you don’t have a sitter?... I want
to help you… Based on what you’ve said, what I would do is ...”

In this conversation, the disadvantaged person is saying don't complain about my
choices; you don’t understand, these were my best choices. While the privileged
would argue that the disadvantaged must start making better choices, and those

5

Social exclusion occurs when a person is deprived of the right to participate in the social system in which
they belong. This prevents some people from fully participating in the usual or normal behaviors that their
society encourages. Social inclusion has been made the aim of EU 2020 initiatives regarding poverty and
the marginalized.
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choices should look like what the privileged person would do. What is not being
acknowledged in this conversation is that neither can relate to the other, even
though they are both talking about decisions and choices. The disadvantaged
understand their limited choices and making the best choice from among those,
while the privileged person wants the disadvantaged person to consider other
choices that would improve their situation.
The challenge here is that the disadvantaged cannot have a view of their
challenges from any perspective other than their own. And the privileged cannot
set aside their view of the disadvantaged’s plight. This inability to set aside both
views of the same circumstances causes challenges when working together to
solve them. As a result, we are faced with the dilemma regarding how or when
intervention is needed, and whose view needs corrected. Do we always satisfy
what the disadvantaged want, even when the decision fails to be supported from
the view of the privileged? Or do we trust the privileged to intercede on behalf of
the disadvantaged because their view of their circumstances is leading them to
make bad choices? To simplify our dilemma, is it better to satisfy the wants,
desires, and choices of the disadvantaged, or to challenge them to make better
choices through interventions by the privileged?
Here, philosophical discipline intercedes, and a utilitarian view of our
challenge emerges; people’s happiness matters. The theory of utility states that
actions are right when they support happiness and wrong when they prevent
happiness. As a result, if a disadvantaged person really believes a choice will
increase their happiness, then it must be honored. Given our dilemma, it should
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be noted that under the utilitarian view happiness is equal between persons.
Therefore, we should not prioritize the happiness of the privileged over the
disadvantaged. As a result, the happiness of the disadvantaged should be a
factor in deciding how to help them. Though, connecting our discussion of the
disadvantaged choices to happiness might seem a challenge. Here we turn to
traditional philosophical thought on the theory known as the greatest happiness
theory – or theory of utility – to explain how choices and happiness are
connected.
John Stuart Mill6 is one of the most influential supporters of utilitarianism.
In his work, “The Subjection of Women,”7 Mill defends the right of a person to find
happiness for themselves on their terms. “To allow to any human beings no
existence of their own but what depends on others is giving are too high a
premium on bending others to their purposes” (Mill 98). Here we understand that
the theory of utility supports the disadvantaged in making their own choices and
living their lives as they choose. This is because it is asking too much of the
disadvantaged to bend to the will of the privileged. Further, this reluctance to
allow others to compel the disadvantaged to choices not of their own making is a
way to support the disadvantaged in living a self-determined (autonomous) life.

6

John Stuart Mill was a utilitarian who supports the view of the greatest happiness for the greatest
number. As a result, he would challenge the abdication of the disadvantaged’s choices to the privileged
because each person deserves to determine for themselves how to attain their happiness.
7
This essay is especially profound, due to its support for the independence of women from the ties of the
patriarchy. This notable work was written in 1861 and is especially relevant today, since those who live in
poverty and have a disadvantaged status are more often women than men.
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It seems our dilemma has been made a bit more complicated regarding
intervention efforts. This is because intervention is not just about deciding for the
disadvantaged what is best for them, it is also deciding when we have grounds to
challenge or deny their autonomy and happiness. The greater question, though,
seems to be whether helping the disadvantaged get what they want helps them.

2.

Preference Utilitarianism and Aiding the Disadvantaged
As mentioned above, utilitarians support the greatest happiness principle.

However, basing a theory of intervention on happiness seems challenging. After
all, happiness can mean different things to different people. I might be most
happy if I were to get a new car. You might be most happy to get a raise.
Happiness is subjective and determined by the person seeking it. As a result,
some utilitarians think that the good is constituted by people getting what they
want, and so the right action is the one that satisfies the most and strongest
preferences. Those that view preferences in this way are preference utilitarians.
So with this view, if I want a new car, then it is good when I get a new car.
However, I might be in a situation where even though I want a new car, I
cannot get a new car. If I then choose to decorate my room (as a result of my
inability to get a car), it would be wrong to say that I preferred my second choice
in the same way that I did my first (the car). What is important here, is that a
second-best choice does not mean that it was desired or wanted. It was merely a
choice that I had available to me and was attainable. As a result, it is then right to
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say that I still prefer the car, even as I embrace my new room. Further still, it is
also fair to point out that I didn’t get what I wanted, instead I got something else.
The preference utilitarian would point out that what matters in this instance is that
what I wanted and what I got did not match.
A robust defense of preference utilitarianism has been presented by
Harriet Baber.8 In her paper “Adaptive Preferences,” she states that “Preference
utilitarianism is the only form of utilitarianism consistent with the important
philosophical principle of preference autonomy, the principle that in deciding what
is good and what is bad for a given individual, the ultimate criterion can only be
his own wants and his own preferences” (Baber 106). This statement makes
clear that the idea that what is best for a person is based on what that person
determined they wanted.
As a result, in our dilemma regarding the privileged and the
disadvantaged, the preference utilitarian would support giving the disadvantaged
what they wanted. But, what should we do when people don’t want what’s best
for them? The preference utilitarian view challenges us to accept these
preferences and to fulfill them – even when they are harmful. As a result,
instances where the disadvantaged want things that are not good for them prove
to be difficult cases for the preference utilitarian.
The preference utilitarian would remind us, though, that the only thing that
matters is that a person’s preferences are fulfilled and not the circumstances

8

Harriet Baber is a philosopher recognized for her work in feminist philosophy and the philosophy of
economics.
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surrounding them (Baber 108). This does not deny that a disadvantaged
existence is plagued with bad circumstances, that they often have little accurate
information, or that they may cause themselves harm. Instead, while these
factors matter, they don’t have the effect one might expect on choice.
Here is how the preference utilitarian escapes this challenge. Let’s revisit
our car example from above. If I want a new car and get a new car, then this is
good. Similarly, if I want clean water and get clean water, then this is also good.
It doesn’t matter that my circumstances compelled me to want clean water.
Instead, what matters is what I wanted and that I got it. Of course, if my situation
changed, I might want a garden in my village. Again, what would matter is getting
the garden. To reiterate what was said earlier, regarding second choices or third
or more, it doesn’t matter if I get a newly decorated bedroom (or anything else)
instead of the car. I wanted the car. Likewise, it doesn’t matter how dire my
circumstances, I can still decide that I want something and still look for it to
happen. And I can consider it good when I receive it. When my preferences are
satisfied, it is good for me. And when my I don’t get what I want, it isn’t good.
Therefore, what I deem to be good is the key to the utilitarian view.
However, it is important to consider whether a true preference is anything I
want for myself with no caveats. The only restriction the preference utilitarian
would assert is that preferences cannot be ascribed to me that are not my own.
As Baber explains, my true preferences can be identified by a lack of coercion,
understanding the facts of the matter, and are not desired due to my duty to
others (Baber 107). Therefore, if no one ordered me to get a garden (coercion),
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and I understood that a garden was feasible (information), and I didn’t feel like I
should want a garden because others wanted one (duty to others) – then my
desire for a garden is my true preference.
Given our dilemma regarding the disadvantaged, the preference utilitarian
offers to them important benefits. The first is the ability to be recognized as
“rational choosers”, despite their difficult circumstances (Baber 126). The second
benefit is that this means that the disadvantaged should get what they want,
even if the privileged would want something different. Under this view, the
disadvantaged’s choices matter most. Preference utilitarianism also explains that
if the choices of the disadvantaged are troubling that they simply need better
options.
Even with all these benefits, one could still rightly question if the
circumstances of the disadvantaged can be dismissed so easily. It seems that
someone’s disadvantaged state, and the challenges that come with it, deserve
more consideration than the preference utilitarian grants them.

3.

Adaptive Preferences
There are philosophers who answer a resounding “No” when it comes to

the dismissal of circumstances and their effect on choice-making. This is
because a person’s circumstances limit their available options. In other words,
one cannot expect to have their wish for clean water to be met, if no clean water
is available – and there seems to be something very wrong with choosing to drink
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dirty water even as a second choice. Further, if a person was never made aware
that water could be clean, a person couldn’t want it, let alone expect to get it. As
a result, preference utilitarianism can be challenged by those concerned with
adaptive preferences; preferences adapted by circumstance.
John Elster9 characterized adaptive preferences as unconscious
preferences that are formed when people downgrade their options and instead
seek those that are attainable to them (Khader 46). This is most often discussed
as the fox and the grapes scenario. A fox struggles to reach grapes but cannot.
As a result, instead of striving for the grapes, he determines that they are
poisonous. This causes the fox no longer to reach for the desired grapes and
instead he opts to reach for what is more easily attainable or nonpoisonous.
However, because the fox unconsciously rejects seeking the grapes, it is still
possible that the fox (should the grapes become available) would reach for them
again.
An important distinction is that Elster considers this process unconscious.
Under Elster’s characterization there is no conscious second choice-making
process, instead the person making the choice simply defers to what is attainable
and views it as their choice. This is done without considering what a first choice
might have been. In fact, the person may not even be aware that there was ever
another choice. Though, because Elster favors the fox and the grapes model of
adaptation, he is skeptical of changes that are necessitated by circumstances.

9

Jon Elster is a political theorist whose work focuses on the philosophy of social sciences and theories of
individual and group choice.

13

One would have to be aware of this process to include circumstances as
relevant. Unfortunately, this unconscious process (of reaching for the grapes,
deferring, and being open to them again) also makes adaptive preferences
unstable and irrational (Cudd).
Yet, Martha Nussbaum10 disagrees with this account of adaptive
preferences. Instead she asserts that adaptation occurs when a person “adjust[s]
their desires to the way of life they know” (Symposium 78). With respect to
preferences, this means that a person will desire or prefer those things that they
are familiar with and believe to be accessible. As a result, certain options will fail
to be considered because they were never experienced or believed to be
possible. After all, there is no use striving for things out of reach or unattainable;
instead one must adapt to what is possible given their circumstances. For
example, if I know that I am short, then I am unlikely to pursue becoming a flight
attendant. Similarly, if I have no understanding that germs cause me to become
sick, then I might believe that cold weather makes me ill.
Nussbaum claims that the case of Jayamma is an example of her view of
adaptive preferences:

10

Martha Nussbaum is a prominent social and political philosopher whose work on the Capabilities
Approach (focusing on human development and welfare) has won her numerous awards and accolades.
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Jayamma defends a woman’s right to safety but fails to see her financial
mistreatment both at work and at home. At work, Jayamma, and other
women are paid less and endure heavier work. Even when she was denied
a promotion, she simply accepted this as fact. There was no emotional
labor or protest invested on her part. And when her husband took earnings
and wasted them on non-necessities, while she financially provided for the
children and did all the housework, she responded no differently. This is
simply how things were and how they would continue. Unfortunately,
Jayamma, both failed to recognize herself as a being with rights and the
concept that she had been wronged (Symposium 69).

In this example, Jayamma failed to recognize her suffering and that she had
rights as a human being. And she failed to help herself or advocate for her own
fair treatment, in fact she did not react to her suffering at all.
As demonstrated here, there are shifts in the characterization of adaptive
preferences, even among philosophers.11 Elster required that adaptation be an
unconscious response to the available options, while rejecting adaptations to
circumstances, and deeming preference adaptation unstable and irrational. In
contrast, Nussbaum asserts that those with adaptive preferences adapt their
desires based on the way of life that they know.
The challenge of accepting adaptive preferences, however, is to question
the rationality of the disadvantaged: they are at best unconscious of the process
where they adapt their preferences and at worst mentally damaged to the extent
11

We cannot discuss all views of adaptive preferences here. However, one would be remiss not to
mention the work of Nussbaum, Baber, Harsayni, Sen, Elster, Bartky, Cudd, Dworkin, Daly, McKinnon, and
Sommers regarding adaptive preferences. If including related work, though, the list is nearly endless.
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that their harm goes unrecognized by them. Given this understanding of adaptive
preference, it does not seem surprising that in our dilemma of who is better
positioned to help the poor, we now have an argument that supports the
intervention of the privileged into the choice-making of the disadvantaged.
If one accepts that the disadvantaged have adaptive preferences, then it is
appropriate to claim that the disadvantaged often don’t know what is good for
them or that they are too broken to object to what is bad for them. Either way, the
privileged won’t really be helping the disadvantaged if they give them what the
privileged want.

4.

Critiquing Adaptive Preferences
Suppose we look at preferences in a different light. What if preferences

not only help us get something that we prefer but that they can also help us get
closer to something that we prefer when it is not available. In other words, what if
preferences are merely a step in the direction of what is truly desired or wanted,
instead of the end of what is truly preferred. It seems reasonable to say that in
the absence of getting something that is wanted, persons might choose to get
something that approximates what is preferred or that brings us closer to what is
truly preferred. About the disadvantaged and their dire circumstances (where
choices are few), it seems reasonable to think that if they could not get what they
wanted, then they would try to find an option that brings them closer to what they
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preferred. If the disadvantaged use their preferences as means to an end, it
would also follow that these preferences will be adaptive.
Let us refer to means-preferences as those preferences that shift with
circumstances and adapt, but that also bring the disadvantaged closer to what
they truly intrinsically care about. If there are means-preferences, though, then
there should be end-preferences. For our purposes, let’s define end-preferences
as those things that people stably value. This means that when a person makes
a choice, what they are responding to is the value that choice offers. With this
view of preferences, we can now see how some of the challenging choices of the
disadvantaged might merely reflect a means-preference and not an endpreference.
Now suppose that a person chose to live in their car rather than accept
public assistance for housing. While speaking with them, we learn that they reject
all forms of assistance and instead they speak of solving their problems by
themselves. Here the choice to live in their car would be the means-preference,
while autonomy/freedom is the end-preference. When we understand the
relationship of means- and end-preferences, we discover that there may be many
ways to address this person’s value of autonomy.
It is now possible, therefore, to understand that sometimes the privileged
might rightly reject the means-preferences of the disadvantaged in favor of a
different solution. After all, it does not have to be the case that a person’s first
choice means-preference is their best choice. And since means-preferences
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might be adapted anyway, there is no harm in showing the disadvantaged a
better solution, but only if their end-preference is not ignored.
It should be clear that for the privileged discussing or negotiating with the
disadvantaged various ways to change their most deeply held values (endpreferences) isn’t a worthy endeavor. What a person values due to their
circumstances is likely valued because of necessity and not because of want. It
would not be right to say that a person should not value safety in lieu of freedom
or freedom in lieu of safety when circumstances dictate otherwise. And as you
might imagine, attempts to persuade persons away from what they deeply value
is rightfully difficult. As a result, should the privileged fail to consider the endpreferences of the disadvantaged, they won't be able to help them.
About value, it is right to say that people can and do value multiple things.
While people's values are stable and deeply held, their relative priority to each
other can shift. Like our example above, a person who values the security their
job offers may acknowledge that their future opportunities are limited. If offered a
new position with advancement opportunities, they may now deprioritize their
desire for security and opt to accept the position on offer.
It is tempting to refer to this reprioritization of values as an adaptive value
theory. However, we must choose carefully how we explain what has been
identified here. What we have identified is a significant prioritization shift that
reflects how important a value is as determined by circumstance, not whether it
has altogether ceased to matter. Further, no new values were established either.
There is a second concern worth noting, regarding whether to refer to this
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reprioritization as something adaptive. As noted above, the word adaptive has
been chosen by adaptive preference theorists and carries a pejorative tone due
to their work. Considering this, referring to my view as an adaptive value
approach would also carry the same pejorative connotation of adaptive
preference views, which I reject.
I will refer to this process, therefore, as appropriately adaptive reevaluations. To summarize, appropriately adaptive re-evaluations refer to a shift
in how important a value is to a person in relation to the other values held by
them. These are considered appropriate because changes in circumstances
rightly causes a person to re-evaluate their situation; this is rational. This view is
adaptive because both improvements and deteriorations in our circumstances
trigger shifts in prioritizing our values. And this process is considered a reevaluation because no new values are established, nor have any ceased to
matter.
At this point an example is needed to demonstrate how the appropriately
adaptive re-evaluation view works in practice. Let’s consider the circumstances
of a person from the LGBTQIA+12 community who lives in a society where being
‘out’ is unsafe. It seems reasonable, then, that this person, in order to protect
their safety, hides their sexuality from being discovered. Here, the member of the
community has prioritized their safety over their freedom.

12

This acronym refers to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual, queer, intersex, androgynous, and others
(including those without a category or group affiliation).
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As a result of this prioritization, this person may choose to dress
differently, carry a weapon, become reclusive, fail to apply for aid for fear of
being ‘outed’ or documented as ‘one of them,’ or even change their name (in the
case of being transgender). As a result of prioritizing safety over freedom (and
other deeply held values), any interventions designed to help this person will be
rejected by them, if those interventions do not ensure (as much as possible) their
safety. Further, any attempts to convince this person to ‘come out’ would similarly
be rejected.
While conventional philosophical thought focuses on the choices of the
disadvantaged, my view recognizes that there is a deep value that this person is
seeking in their choices. This person isn’t choosing between how to dress or
what their name should be; instead they are prioritizing their safety and making
choices accordingly. As a result, under my view, it is appropriate to refer to the
preferences of a name change, dressing differently, or carrying a weapon as
means-preferences with safety as the end-preference.
Should the person we’ve discussed move to an area where it is safe to be
‘out,’ it is reasonable for them to realize that they are now safe. As a result, they
are now able to shift their values and reprioritize their freedom over their safety.
Therefore, those choices that represent freedom would now be embraced. These
new choices are still means-preferences which support the re-prioritized value
(end-preference) of freedom.
Further, in this sketch it would be right to say that what is valued by the
straight members of this (same) society may be completely different. They may
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neither prioritize their safety (since they are safe), and they may not value
freedom (since their freedom may not be restricted). That does not mean,
however, that they do not value those things. Nor does it mean their choices
don’t support their values in the same way as the disadvantaged. Instead, a
straight person in the same society may, for example, value financial security. In
that case, their means-preferences (choices) will support their desired endpreference of financial security.
In both cases, the privileged and disadvantaged use the same process.
What might look to be a poor choice by the disadvantaged is instead a rational
value prioritization process that the privileged also use.

5.

Aid
In the previous section, we discussed end-preferences and means-

preferences to sort out what the disadvantaged prefer in comparison to what they
value. In the process, we found the connection between the two types of
preferences and explained how means-preferences help to satisfy the endpreference (value). Further, we recognized that every person adapts their values
and reprioritizes them to fit their circumstances. And we referred to this process
as appropriately adaptive re-evaluations. What we have not discussed at length,
given this new understanding, is what the privileged should do to help the
disadvantaged.

21

In order to help the disadvantaged, the privileged must ensure that any
help offered to the disadvantaged is targeted to what they value most: their endpreferences. This is because end-preferences are stably held but are also
indicative of the circumstances in which the disadvantaged live. The privileged,
therefore, must consider these values as inviolable end-preferences. Further,
attempts to modify the deeply held values of another can deeply damage the
relationship between those persons. And when it comes to convincing the
disadvantaged to trust the privileged, trust is required. Therefore, only regarding
end-preferences, the preference utilitarian is correct, we should give the
disadvantaged what they prefer.
Means-preferences require different handling than end-preferences; this is
because these preferences adapt to circumstance and are not stably held. As a
result, the privileged have grounds to challenge these, since there may be more
than one way to respond to the values the disadvantaged are seeking. Also,
some of the means-preferences may not benefit the disadvantaged in the way
that they had hoped. For instance, a disadvantaged person who has recently
been released from a treatment program or prison may choose to live with others
who were released prior. Though this choice (by all appearances) is supportive
and beneficial, the absence of a stable person living in the house challenges all
who live there to remain out of trouble and to recover.
As a result, additional suggestions or ideas should be offered by the
privileged to aid the disadvantaged, but only if the new suggestions do not
challenge or violate the disadvantaged’s end-preferences. Because of the nature
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of means-preferences, therefore, intervention is warranted. As a result, we can in
this instance only, accept that the adaptive preference theorist is correct –
sometimes intervention is warranted because the disadvantaged’s meanspreferences might not help them as they had hoped. And while it is acceptable to
allow for intervention there is no reason to accept a view of the disadvantaged as
mentally damaged or broken.
While intervention is a justifiable reaction when damning circumstances
cause undue challenges to the disadvantaged, it cannot be the case that every
preference or desire should be interrupted or hindered by the privileged. This is
because a person’s happiness does matter to them and it is difficult to be
pleased with a life lived on the terms of others. The privileged should cautioned,
therefore, against depriving disadvantaged persons of their autonomy any more
than necessary. On these grounds we also find ourselves supporting both the
basic utilitarian principle of happiness and autonomy.
Therefore, my view of preferences as means- and end-preferences, along
with appropriately adaptive re-evaluations have allowed us to keep the best of
each of the preference theories we have discussed. We have maintained the
autonomy of the disadvantaged and their right to a happy life on their terms, we
have supported fulfilling end-preferences because they are deeply and stably
held values, and we have allowed for intervention insofar as there is no violation
of the disadvantaged’s end-preferences. We have also defended the right of the
disadvantaged to live life on their own terms.
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Let’s consider a case often cited in philosophical literature; the case of an
abused woman named Vasanti. Martha Nussbaum introduces us to her dilemma
in the following way:
Vasanti stayed in an abusive marriage and only left after her husband had a
vasectomy. This is because she believed that while abuse was bad, that it was
also simply a part of a woman’s life – to leave her home and be with her
husband even if there is violence. She had no idea that there were laws against
this behavior, or that she (and women) had rights to protect them from such
harm. While this may seem unbelievable to some, many women believe this
to be the case. “… There is something wrong with the preference (if we should
call it that) to put up with abuse…” (Symposium 69).

As noted by Nussbaum, Vasanti’s choice may or may not be referred to as
an adaptive preference. However, there is something wrong with Vasanti’s
willingness to stay in her abusive marriage. Here the preference utilitarian
responds that if there is a problem with Vasanti’s decision to stay, that she
needed better choices. In the absence of those better choices, Vasanti had a
right to choose what she needed to do given her circumstances. The adaptive
preference theorist would insist that intervention was needed due to her choice to
remain in an abusive marriage. At this point we have arrived at the expected
dilemma; do we support Vasanti’s free choice to remain with her husband despite
her abuse, or do we intervene on Vasanti’s behalf?
My view allows for both. Once we identify Vasanti’s end-preference
(providing for potential children) then we can offer solutions that address her
means-preference for remaining in her abusive marriage. What is not permitted
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under my view is finding a way to justify her choice to stay, nor devaluing her
prioritization of providing for her future children. Instead, we can recognize that
providing for future children is a worthy value and that the choice to remain
(which supports that value) must be helped. Now that Vasanti has left her
abusive husband, she will re-evaluate the ordering of her values to match her
newly found freedom. Though she may in fact still value stability for potential
children (it was her husband who had the vasectomy), she won’t value it more
than her safety.

6.

Objection
Let’s return to our opening example and revisit Sally’s preference for living

in her car. Using an end- and means- view of preferences, Sally must have a
means-preference that is adaptable and an end-preference that is stable. If we
look at the dialogue that began this work, we are drawn to the following
statements shared about Sally’s choices:
“Sally repeatedly insists that she’s proud that she’s never accepted
help from anyone. She’d be the first one to tell you that she’s never
been on welfare, never taken a hand-out, never begged, and never
leaned on the government. Oddly, her face lights up with pride as
she recounts these achievements.”
If we look closely at the words used in this example, Sally reveals that she values
her autonomy beyond all other things. We arrive at this conclusion based on the

25

following: she’s proud that she’s never accepted help, she shares that she has
never accepted any help, and she considers these to be achievements. Clearly,
her independence matters to her, and because it does, this should be recognized
as her end-preference. However, her means-preference of living in her car is
what first drew our attention. As a result, it would be right for the privileged to
intervene and offer other solutions to living in her car.
We can now see that the interventions suggested to Sally must not violate
her end-preference of autonomy. Given these criteria, interventions must be
presented as maximizing the attainment of her end-preference. Therefore,
subsidized housing must be presented in such a way that Sally can see that she
could remain autonomous while accepting the help that has been offered. If Sally
rejects all types of subsidized housing, however, the privileged should consider
what options might be available that support her autonomy. Through these
methods, it is now possible for the privileged to assist Sally in ways that will truly
help her.
Some may object, however, that it is not possible to interview every
person to determine their end-preferences. This would indeed be troubling,
especially regarding global initiatives intended to help the disadvantaged. My
response, though, is that this concern overcomplicates intervention in ways that
are not needed. No one needs to interview every disadvantaged person to
understand their individual values. Instead, the privileged should look for
common values among the disadvantaged in similarly related circumstances.
After all, circumstances are what trigger the appropriately adaptive re-evaluation
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process. So those in similar situations are likely to have the same or similar value
priorities. What at first appears to be a challenge is the greatest benefit of my
view of preferences: that by focusing on end-preferences, the privileged can help
groups of similarly disadvantaged people. If Sally, who is homeless and living in
her car, values her autonomy, then it is likely that others like Sally (who live in the
same society) also value their autonomy.
As a result, my view of preferences and the corresponding appropriately
adaptive re-evaluation process are also globally relevant. This is because endpreference (value) recognition can be applied to other societies and cultures.
Consider, Jayamma who did not recognize or protest her financial mistreatment
by both her boss and her husband. Here, my view of preferences would regard
Jayamma’s lack of protest as a means-preference while her end-preference
would need to be determined. Upon learning her end-preference, interventions
can be suggested to address her means-preferences that also do not violate her
end preferences. Still, we have crossed the globe to India with the necessary
understanding to help Jayamma.

7. Conclusion
When philosophers talk about preferences, they talk about the choices
that were made. Of course, if somebody chooses between A or B it is understood
that B offered something to them that A didn't. When we talk about adding value
to the preference debate, we are talking about the value that puts one choice
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above another. This explains why sometimes the most difficult and challenging
choices – the ones that ultimately seem counterintuitive or harmful to us by
others – are based on values. As philosophers we should not simply talk about
whether a person preferred A or B, but also how and why they preferred either
option. And to do this, we must discuss choices as being the means to an end –
the value that is being sought.
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